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As the doctrine of consideration

important principles peculiar

is

one of the most

to the common law,

it

is

not strange that there should be many theories put forth

as to its origin.

One

learned writer attempts to

prove that consideration is

Causa,

the Roman principle of

through the Court of Chancery (Sal-

filtered

mond's History of Contract,

3 L.

Q. Rev.,

166).

Another traces consideration to the action of debt

(Holmes'

in

The Common Law).

assumpsit

A third seeks the origin

(Hare on Contracts);

declaring that it

is,

while still

another,

"impossible to refer considera-

tion to a single source,"

derives the idea of benefit

to the promisor from indebitatus assumpsit,

and detri-

2
ment to the promisee from the action on the case for

deceit (Ames'

History of Assurnpsit,

The theory advanced by Prof.

mitted, the true one.

2 Harvard L.

Ames is,

it

is

Rev.

1).

sub-

He shows that in the twentieth

year of Henry sixth's reign an action was brought where

the defendant promised for 6ne hundred pounds to him

paid,

but there-

to sell certain lands to the plaintiff,

after enfeoied another of the land.

A majority of the

court thought that the action would lie,

time of Henry VII it

became

and by the

settled law that it

would.

But a traverse of the feoffment to a stranger was held

good (Y.

plaintiff

B.,

2 H. VII.

12,

pl.

15).

The damage to the

was clearly as great where the defendant re-

fused to convey as where he conveyed to another;

and it

3
was not long before the judges allowed the action Upon

refusal to convey,(Keilw,-, 17, pl. 25).

The cause of

action was not the promise, but the money paid or act.

done by the plaintiff in reliance thereupon.

The de-

ceit of the defendant and the detriment suffered by the

plaintiff were the necessary allegations.

was in tort but the step

The action

from tort to contract was so

short that it was taken' almost unconsciously.

Thus a-

rose one branch of the doctrine of consideration, det-

riment to the prormisee.

Judge Here, writing a little

earlier than Prof. Ames, came to the same conclusion

(Hare on Contracts, Chap. VII.).
The other branch of the doctrine, benefit to the

promisor, is plainly traceable to the action of debt.

4
Sir Henry Maine has demonstrated,

with a clearness

of reasoning and a perspicuity of statement

it

beyond a doubt,

school (Rousseau's

that the theory of Rousseau and his

Inquiry,

Book T.,

the original social contract is

It

Chap.

false;

.)

as to

and that primi-

or no idea of contractual re-

tive society has little

lations.

that place

is evident, then, that actions for the

possession of property are of earlier date than actions

to enforce promises.

action of debt,

earliest

So it

which is

is

probably true that the

generally thought to be the

contractual action,

was originally,

not an ac-

tion for enforcing an executory promise to pay money,

but one for the possession of money passed by grant,
ye t remaining in

the hands of the grantor

(Maine's

5

Ancient Law, 311; Langdell's Sumnmary Cont., 99,100;

2 Harvard L.

R.,

19,

note 2).

The essential

elements

of debt were, that the debtor had received some benefit,

and, that that which he gave in exchange remained in his

possession.

Here then we find the element of benefit

to the promisor, and we have but to trace the descent of

this idea from debt to consideration.

The defendant

in

debt could by waging his law es-

this proved to be a great hardship,

cape liability*

and

in the latter part of the sixteenth cehtury we find cases

allowing aptions on the promise where the defendant,

being indebted,

203)

1603,

and in

it

promised to pay.

Slade's case,

(4 Rep.,

(Godb., 13: 2 Leon.

94 B,)

decided in

was held that a debtor could be sued. upon an

6
implied promise to pay the debt,

and that,

tract executory implied an assumpsit."

origin of indebitatus assumpsit.

ed,

as was debt,

on benefit;

"every con-

This was the

The action was found-

and from that time to the

present benefit to the promisor has been sufficient con-

sideration to uphold a contract

(Ames'

Hist.

of Assuip-

sit, 1 H. L. Rev.).

Mr.

Justice Holmes thinks that benefit to the prom-

isor, quid pro quo, though of similar origin, was dif-

ferently developed.

He argues that,

as tranaction

witnesses were brought in to prove the debt and, as they

were only allowed to testify to that which they had ac-

tually seen,

they could be of use only where property

had passed to the debtor.

Hence, debts where property

had

not passed could not be proven and were

ly unenforceable.

So it

became necessary

debtor should receive some benefit,

consequent-

that the

in other words,

a consideration for his promise.

The evidence is

slight that consideration

is

a mod-

ification of the causa of Rom~an law, introduced through

the medium of equity.

The principal argument advanced

by those who support that idea,

is

that consideration

can be traced to no other source; and, for the reason

that the doctrine is

applied in

equity,

it

is. more like-

ly that the conmon law has borrowed from equity,

than

that equity has borrowed from the common law (3 L.

Rev., 174).

Q.

But were all positive proof as to the

source wantihg, still would the indications point to a

8
common law origin.

Consideration,

as applied in

equi

ty, was loosely defined; the considerations of love

and affection,

(Brett vs.

J.

and moral obligation being included

S.

& Wife,

Cro.

Eliz.,

756); while the

consideration of to-day is

substantially that of the

early common law; so it

more likely that equity is

indebted to law,

is

than law to equity.

That equity should have appropriated

the doctrine

from the common law rather than from Rome is

probable

for the resemblance between the Roman causa and the

English consideration

on Contracts,

152).

is

very slight indeed (Pollock

9
Defined.

Consideration

Consideration

dispute.

itself,

as well as its

origin,

is

in

It would seem at first sight, that a princi-

ple which enters so completely into nearly every rela-

tion of man with his fellow, would be definitely set-

tled.

Yet here again we find the savants at vari-

ance.

The definition of consideration most commonly ac-

cepted,

(L.

in

R.

is

that given by Lush,

10 Ex.,

162)

J.,

in

Currie vs.

which is: "a valuable

the sense of the law,

Misa

consideration

may consist either in

some

right, interest, or profit, or benefit accruing to the

one party,

or some forbearance,

responsibility,

given,

suffered,

detriment,

loss,

or

or undettaken by the

othe r' . ',

Prof. Langdell defines it as:

en or done by the promisee

(Langdell's

Sum.

Cont.,

in

"The thing giv-

enchange for the promise.

45).

"

He strenuously insists

that benefit to the promisor is not a factor, and that

the sole requisite is

detriment to the promisee

(Sum.

Cont., 62-65); though he acknowledges that benefit to

the promisor was necessary

a consideration,

if

in

debt; and says that such

fully executed,

to support the debt; but denies its

other contracts

(Sum.

Cont.,

is

still

sufficient

ability to uphold

46).

Coming from such a source,

Prof,. Langdell's

ous effort to change the law to what he thought it

to be,

has had no inconsiderable

of the profossion (see

3 L.

vigor-

ought

effect upon the minds

Q. Rev.,

172; Harvard Law

11
Rev.

ITol.

It does not appear,

2 p.l).

however,

that

any court has as yet sanctioned his doctrine with ju-

dicial approval.

Judge Hare follows substantially the definition of

Pattison,

J.,

in

Thomas vs.

Thomas (2 Q. B. 851,

859);

"Consideration means something which is of some value

in

the eye of the law moving from the plaintiff.

or some detriment

may be some benefit to the defendant,

to the plaintiff,

but in

from the plaintiff."

all events,

It

it

must be moving

(see Hare on Contracts,

147).

This latter doctrine, though supported by such em-

inent authority as Hare and Chitty,

ical.

is

somewhat

illog-

It is difficult to conceive of a case where the

consideration moving from the promisee is

not detrimen-

12
tal to him,

and yet is

Possibly it

was this difficulty which Prof.

beneficial

to the promisor.

perceived and endeavored to obviate,

consideration rests solely in

by asserting that

detriment

And for all practical purposes,

Langdell

to the promisee.

the doctrines of Hare

and Langdell may be considered as the same.

In this country it is quite universally held that

the consideration need not move from the prornisor*

the courts of several

states even going so far as to

allow a third person to sue upon a contract made for his

benefit, though the promise is not made to him ( Law-

rence vs.
175).

Fox,

20 N. Y. 268;

Burr vs.

The opposition to this is

Peers,

based,

on the ground that the person suing is

24 N.Y.

not so much

not a party to

13
the consideration,

agreement.

as that he is

not a parly to the

The contract can be altered or rescinded

without his consent (dissenting

opinion of Comstock,

J.,

in Lawrence vs. Fox).

In

Farley vs.

Cleveland

ant agreed with plaintiff

(4 Cowen,432)

the defend-

to pay an overdue note of

$100., running from one Moon to plaintiff.

eration was fifteen tons of hay (value

to defendant by Moon.

$150.)

It

delivered

The Court held that this was

sufficient consideration and allowed plaintiff

er.

The consid-

seems as if' $150.

to recov-

worth of hay was ample con-

sideration for a promise to pay a $100.

note.

The

Court for the Correction of Errors must have so thought,
for they affirmed the decision (9 Cowen,

639),

Parley

14
vs.

Cleveland has been cited with approval from that

time to the present by the courts of New York and va-

rious other states

In

858 (Sup.

Malone vs.

Ct.

Cal.,

(69 N. Y.

285: 14 Kas.

Crescent City Co.

1888))

agreement with plaintiff,

defendant

497),

(18 Pac.

Rep.

entered into an

a creditor of one Murray,

by which defendant was to pay plaintiff

$100.

for every

run of logs which Murray should-deliver to defendant.

It was held that the contract bol:nd defendant to pay
/

plaintiff that amount for every run so delivered, wheth.

er defendant

owed Murray anything or not.

The acceptance

of a bill

of exchange is

not found-

ed on a consideration moving from the promisee.

The

consideration moves from the drawer to the acceptor.

15
It

may be set up in

the acceptor is

opposition to this that,

"when sued,

estopped from denying a consideration."

That is true.-- But what consideration?

eration m6ving from the promisee,

Not a consid-

for he knows that

there is none moving from him; and the acceptor's de-

nial that there is

any such will work no fraud.

The

acceptor is simply estopped from denying a consideration

moving from the drawer,

and that is

the consideration

which is presumed, and which supports the promise.

It

is

submitted that the rule that consideration

may move from a third Party ought to,

over that laid down in Thomas vs.
859),

though Thomas vs.

inertt writers as Chitty,

Thomas is

Hare,

and will prevail

Thomas (2 Q.. B.,

851,

supported by such em-

and Langdell.

For it

16
is

evident that injustice would be done in

ilar

to Farley vs.

held.

and in

cases sim-

Cleveland were the contract not up-

The whole history of contract, in the English

other systems of jurisprudence,

shows that the

tendency is to enlarge, rather than to abridge the

scope of promises,

which ought,

enforced.

which is

in

until all promises are enforced

upon grounds of reason and equity,

to be

There is no reason to suppose that the rule

fo-unded in

this case,

equity and good conscience will not,

prevail.

17
Classes

of

Cons

iderat

ion

Consideration was divided by the earlier writers
into two classes; good, and valuable.

A good consid-

eration being one of natural love and affection (2 Black.
Com.,

297; Ellis vs.

Nimmo,

Lloyd and G. Rep.,

333).

The equity courts for a time upheld this doctrine,

per-

fecting imperfect conveyances and enforcing c-ontracts
based on the meritorious consideration of love and affection (Ellis vs. Nimmo,
588 and cases cited).

supra; Pomeroy's Equity jur.,
But it

is now quite well set-

tled that a meritorious consideration is not sufficient
either in equity,

or at law (Young vs.

Young,

80 N. Y.,

422; Phillips vs. Fry, 14 Allen 36; Jefferys vs. Jefferys,

I Crai.

& Phil.,

137; WVhitaker vs.

Whitaker,

52

18
N.

368).

Ye,

Such a consideration is still, however,

upheld in Kentucky.

by McIntire vs.

The doctrine was inculcated there

Hughes (4 Bibb,

1863).

The courts of

that state have ever since been limiting that case,

it

as yet,

has not,

vs.

Graham,

2'S.

but

been expressly overruled (Cotton

W. Rep.,

647).

Lord Mansfield essayed to introduce a third class.

In

the case of Hawkes vs.

one who was bo-ind in morals,

held that if

tie by an express promise,

forced,

Saunders (1 Cowper,

289)

he

increased the

that promise might be en-

the moral obligation being a sufficient consid-

eration.

The annotators of Wennall vs.

& P.

in

2147)

Adney (3 B.

an exaustive note comrbatted the doctrine.

They endeavored to show that the so-called moral obli-

19
gation was not effective

as a consideration,

the decisions to that effect

and that

should be based on the

ground of waiver.

The note to Wennall vs. Adney has been more often

followed than the rule laid dovrn by Lord Mansfield.

And it

now quite generally held that a promise to pay

a debt contracted in infancy, or barred by the Statute

of Limitations,

or by a discharge

enforceable as a waiver.

in bankruptcy,

is

The doctrine being that a

person can waive any right introduced by the law for

his benefit which does not extingiilsh the original

debt,

but is

merely a bar to the remedy.

The doctrine of moral obligation is

out of view,

though it

has not,

as is

fast fading

stated by one

20
learned writer,

Sum. Cont.,

completely disappeared (see Langdell's

71).

For in Pennsylvania, in which state

it is held that a discharge in bankruptcy completely

extinguishes the debt, a promise to pay such debt is

If

upheld on the ground of moral obligation.

inal promise

is

the orig-

declared on a demurrer will be sustained.

The subsequent promise is held to b6 the cause of ac-

tion (lurphy vs. Crawford, 114 Pa. St.,

King,

105 Pa.

(92 Pa.

St.,

St.,289,

in

78).

292)

496; Bolton vs.

Stebbins vs.

Crawford

a promise to pay a claim settled

by judgment was held valid, because the judgment was

too small.

In

other states decisions are based on

moral obligations which might well be upheld on better

grounds (Craig vs.

Seitz,

30 N. W. Rep.

(,MAich,)

347;

21
Wizlizenus vs.

0'Fallon,

91 Mo.,

181).

So we may conclude that there

states,

law,

is,

except in

but one kind of consideration recognized

namely,

valuable

a few

in

the

consideration.

This valuable consideration must be something

which the law deems as of value;

thus giving up a con-

tract voidable under the Statute of Frauds (Haigh vs.

Brooks,

10 A. & Ee,

309); but not the relinquiB hing

of a void one (Barnard vs.

p1.

39); forbearance

(Elting vs.

Vanderlyn,

(1 Sid.,212);

Simonds,

1 Rolle's Ab.,

26,

of suit on a well founded claim

4 John.,

237); an assignment

any work or services rendered to a prom-

isor or to a third person;

reposing trust or confidence;

a promise to do a lawful' act;

subscriptions

to a coi'lmon

22
cause may beco,-e each a consideration for the others

(Trustees

vs.

Stetson,

to be weighed,

506); allowing boilers

the giving up of possession being the det.

riment (Brainbridge

Partin

5 Pick.,

vs.

Firmistone,

8 A. & E.,

743).

with possession is the consideration on

of the gratuitous

which most writers base the liability

bailee (Story on Bailments, 171 a; Edwards on Bailments,

73; Schouler on Bailments,

41).

To admit this doc-

trine wovlId be to wrest away the foundation and leave

at the mercy of the shifting sands an important branch

of the law of bailrments.

tion at all it

If

will uphold any promise.

could be held to the greatest

His liability

there is

any considera-

The bailee

care; or as insurer.

would commence before delivery,

for a

23
promise to deliver is,

in

uable as actual delivery.

the eye of the lw,

as val-

24
Adequacy

o f

Consideration

It is not necessary that the consideration shovild
be equal in

value to the promise.

The Court will not

up as a scale holder to weigh the respec-

set itself

tive values of the consideration and the subject mat-

Each party has received what he bargained for,

ter.

and so long as it

say that it

596).

is

of value,

he will not be heard to

not enough (Earl vs.

is

Peck,

64 N. Y.,

Though, where the values are conclusively

fixed by law,

a thing of less value will not be a suf-

ficient consideration for a thing of greater (Bailey

vs.

Day,

26 Me.,

In eqtity,

badge of fraud,

88).

inadequacy of consideration may be a

o rdinadequacy alone will not,
bgere

ac.

25

cording to the better opinion, be a ground for recission

or for refusing specific performance;

unless the inad-

acuacy be so gross as to amount to positive fraud

Equity Jur.,

926, 927).

(por.

26
Where Consideration is Necessary

Contracts

in

our law are of two kinds:

formal,

and simple; the former depending upon form, the latter

upon consideration,

for their validity.

Were the above statements strictly

true,

formal

contracts might be eliminated from the discussion-.

But formal contracts belong to a comparatively early

stage of civilization.

contracts,

They are the first

originating when the conception of contracts

is as yet in embryo.

With the onward march of human

progress more and more atteition is

and less to form,

regarded.

though it

class of

paid to substance

until finally form is

entirely dis-

We have not reached that stage at present,

seems that we are quite rapidl.y nearing the

27
go al.

Contracts under

any consideration.

-eal did not, at first, require

The general rule is

now that in

a sealed instrument the lavw conclusively presuznes a

consideration; but if the actual consideration is ille-

gal, or immoral, the presence of a seal will not save

the contract (Cooch vs. Goodman, 2 A. & E., n.s., 580).

In

'many states the seal is

but presumptive evidence of

consideration" and in others all distinction between

sealed and unsealed instrments

Equity Jur., 70; Stimson's Am.

is

abolished (Por.

Stat. Law, 1564).

Contracts of record, being entered into before the

court,

It

do not require a consideration.

is

a general rule that all simple contracts

28
require,

and are upheld by,

Mansfield is

a consideration.

responsible for an attempt to take con-

Tn Pillans vs

tracts in writing out of the rule.

VanMierop

Lord

(3 Burr., 1663) he gave it as his opinion

that consideration was not necessary to a contract in

writing.

This novel doctrine was not allowed to stand

unchallenged for any length of time; and thirteen years

later in

Rann vs.

Hughes (7 Term Rep.,

350,

note a)

it was decided that the rule of Pillans vs. VanMierop

was unsound,

and that contracts

in

writing stood upon

the same footing as oral contracts.

Rann vs.

Hughes

has since been universally followed by the courts (Cook

vs.

Bradley, v

Conn.,

57;

235; Bishop on Contracts,

Burnett vs.

24).

Bisco,

4 john.,

29
decade has shown us another endeavor to

The last

take a certain class of contracts

consideration.

Prof.

out of the scope of

For this attempt k-je are indebted to

Langdell (Langdell's Sum.

Cont.,

53).

He

insists

that consideration is not necessary to contracts gov-

erned by the law merchant:

of insurance,

bills

of exchange,

and promissory notes.

The reasons he

gives as to promissory notes and bills

1.

That in

struzment

and in

2.

is

of exchange are:

declaring on them the making of the in-

stated,

then that defendant became liable,

consideration of being so liable he promised.

That a promissory note for a pre-existing debt

would be invalid if

6.

policies

it

required a consideration.

That a uavee of a bill

of excviange

could not sie

30
the acceptor if a consideration was necessary.

4.

That if they were mere parol promises the holder

could only sue upon the original consideration.

5.

or note,

That a bill

if

paid at maturity,

operates

as payment of a debt.

To his first premise, it is sufficient answer

that proof ofOno consideration

is

a defence.

As to

reason for thus declaring on promissory notes, see

p.

Hare on Contracts,

proposition,

on his part.

Regarding his second

the payee has put it

accepting the note,

interval.

256.

out of' his power,

by

to collect the debt during the

That is surely sufficient consideration

And the making of a note which the pay-

ee can negotiate,

and on which the maker is

liable to

31
third persons regardless of any set off or defence

is a good consideration for for-

between the parties,

bearance.

In

answer to the third proposition,

funds of the drawer in

sideration.

the

the drawee' s hands are the con-

That the acceptor is bound, whether he has

funds or not, is to be accounted for on the ground, of

estoppel.

A bona fide holder of a promissory note,

for which there was no consideration,

is

sue for the following reason:

The maker,

his name on a negotiable note,

is

ing,

to the

It

without consideration,

is

by placing

estopped from deny-

injury of innocent purchasers,

no consideration.

allowed to

that there was

not that a note is

made valid

but that a party will not be al-

lowed to work a fraud upon innocent third parties.

32
Prof.

Langdell's

last proposition does not help to

prove that a bill or note is valid without considera-

Though he says,

tion.

'it

is

vary clear upon prin-

ciple that these contracts do not require any consid-

erat ion."

The simlle fact that want of consideration

is a complete defence shows that consideration is nec-

essary.

The same answer may be given to his arguments

that insurance policies do not require consideration.

There are certain quasi-contracts which do not re-

quire a consideration,

Estoppel is

these are estoppel

and waiver.

based on the prevention of fraud,

ver on the reasoning that a person is

and wai-

not obliged to

accept & benefit tendered to him by the law.

WTat has heretofore been said as to the necessity

33
for consideration, applies to executory contracts only.

As a general rule executed contracts do not require a

consideration

(Casey's Appeal,

36 Conn.,

where property has been transfered

88).

But

to the injury of

creditors, the consideration may be inquired into,

absence of consideration will be evidence of fraud

(Young vs. Heermans, 66 N. Y. 374).

and

34
Past

Consideration

In contradistinction to cases where the receipt

of the consideration is

cotemporary with the promise,

are cases where the consideration is executed, or more

properly speaking,

past.

These cases have given rise

to many fine distinctions and a vast quantity of dic-

ta; though in latter years the litigated cases seem not

to be very frequent.

It was early held that a past consideration would

not slapport a promise.

The same case, however, which

established that doctrine,

rule.

mentioned an exception to the

The exception was, that wherever the past con-

sideration ensued at the request of the defendant,

wvould support a promise on his part (Hint vs.

Bate,

it

Dyer,

272 4)a

The rule of Hunt vs.

accepted doctrine ever since
4ob.,

vs.

105;1 Chaffee vs,.

Smith,

7 John.,

Bate h:".s been the

(Lampleigh vs.

Thomas,

7 Cowen,

87; Parsons

on Cont.,

Brathwaite,

358; Comstock

391).

reason given for the exception to the rule is,

The

that the

prom:ise relates back to the consideratin, and the request, the act, and the promise thus form one connected

transaction (Bishop on Cont.,

91).

The soundness of the doctrine, it seems with reason,

has

been questioned (Anson on Cont.,

Sum.

Cont.,

90-98).

if

85-90: Langdell's

we cast aside the worn--thread-

bare doctrine of moral obligation,

it

is

difficult to

see any reason why a promise founded on past consider-

ation should ever be enforced.

T
The
law implies a prolm-

36
ise to pay for a benefit rendered on request.

subsequent

express promise is

The cases of Roscorla vs.

Kaye vs.

Dutton (7 M.& G.,

The

but evidence as to value.

Thomas (3 Q. B.,

807)

234) and

hold that the only

promise which will be upheld by a past consideration,

is

that which the law ir plies.

Roscorla vs.

Thomas

appears not to have been questioned, except in one

Irish case (Bradford vs.

Roulston,

8 ITr.

Upon the authority of Roscorla vs.

Com. Law,

Thomas

it

468).

may

truthfully be said that, in legal effect,past consid-

eration is

no consideration.

present it

w:ould support any promise.

Were any consideration

Thus has con-

sideration been freed from one more clinging barnacle.

37
Failure

Consideration

o f

Where there is a failure of consideration the promisor

is released.

He has not received

which the promise was made.

that in return for

The effect

is

the same

as if there never was a consideration (Parsons on Cont.,

386; Essery vs. Cowland,

26 Ch.

Div.,

191).

The difficulty is encountered where there is a

failure of part of the consideration.

illegal or imnoral,

Where part is

and the illegal part cannot be sep-

arated from the good, its illegality will taint the en-

tire contract (Best vs. Jolly, 1 Sid.,

v431;
Webb, 20 0. St.,

Barton vs.

min-s,

Plank Road,

2 Gray,

258).

Gerlach vs.

17 Barb.,

38; Widoe vs.

Skinner,

34 Kas.,86;

337; Perkins vs.

Cum-

Where the illegal can be separ-

38
arated from the good,

the contract will be avoided pro

ex-

and valid so far as the good consideration

tanto,

tends (Chase. -' s Ex'rs vs.

So far the sky is

Burkholder,

comparatively

soon obscure the light.

18 Pa.

48).

St.,

clearbut clouds

Wiere there is simply a fail-

ure of part of the consideration is the contract a-

voided?

Clearly there is

nevertheless,

ing.

it

no meeting of minds,

has been held that the

Leavin? the promisor

sons on Cont..,

that,

289).

contract

is

676;

bind.

cross action (Par-

386; Franklin Vs. Miller, 4 A. & E.,

Hall vs. Minturn, 55 N. Y.,

24 Me.,

to his

but,

599;

Jenness vs. Parker,

This doctrine is founded on the rule

s0 long as there is

will not enquire into its

any consideration,

the courts

adequacy (Bishop on Cont.,

39
74),

but t'.e reason of the rule fails here.

The prom-

isor has not received that which he bargained for.

He has not agreed to the inrcdequate consideration.

Tt seems to be the better doctrine that where the

failure is of a substantial part of the consideration

the promisor is entitled to treat the contract as re-

scinded (Giles vs. Edward, 7 Term Rep.,18; Bowes vs.

Shand, L. R., I Q.

. Div., 470;

s.c., 2 App.

455.467; Norrington vs. Right, 115 U. S.,

In the words of a learned writer:

Cases,

188, 204)w

"An entire consider-

ation which fails partially, fails wholly : and the

court has no jurisdiction to enquire into the extent

of the difference, or whether justice would be done

by allowing plaintiff to recover :rith an allownce for

40
the loss."

(Hare on Contracts,%l ).

The subject is a complicated one,

large part of the law of sales.

involving a

A complete

discussion

of it would necessitate more space than can here be

given; and the writer leaves it for the" consideration"

of wiser heads than his.

